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THE APPLICATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FORCE PROTECTION SOURCE  
OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

VAL L. RUFFO, MAJ, USA  
B.A., The Citadel, Charleston, SC, 1980

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
1996

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
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
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
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

The Application of Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations in the United States Pacific Command by MAJ Val L. Ruffo, USA, 89 pages.

This study assesses the efforts of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), and its service components, to integrate and synchronize new Joint Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations (CFSO) doctrine set forth in Joint Publication 2-01.2. To establish a baseline understanding of terms, the study begins by fully defining CFSO and its doctrinal basis. Two historical case studies from World War II Pacific theaters, the South West Pacific Area (SWPA) theater and the South-East Asia Command (SEAC) theater, are then analyzed along with doctrine to establish historical precedence for CFSO in the Pacific. Two recent PACOM exercises that implemented and tested CFSO concepts are then analyzed to assess the state of integration within the command and the effect CFSO has had on the services and training. Ultimately, this study highlights the fact that CFSO type of operations are nothing new, that emerging Joint and Service doctrine is sound, and that PACOM has effectively integrated these new concepts into their theater operations.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

A2	Senior Air Force Intelligence Officer
ABCA	America-Britain-Canada-Australia
ACOM	Atlantic Command
AFFOR	Air Force Forces
AFIG	Air Force Inspector General
AFOSI	Air Force Office of Special Investigations
AFOSI-IOC	Air Force Office of Special Investigations - Intelligence Operations Center
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ARFOR	Army Forces
BOS	Battlefield Operating System
C2	Command and Control
CENTCOM	Central Command
CFSO	Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations
CI	Counterintelligence
CIC	Counter Intelligence Corps
CIHO	Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence Officer
CISO	Counterintelligence Staff Officer
DA	Department of the Army
DCID	Director, Central Intelligence Directive
DCSINT	Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
EUCOM	European Command
FIS	Foreign Intelligence Services
FM	Field Manual

G2	Senior Army or Marine Intelligence Officer
GHQ	General Headquarters
HMAS	Her Majesties Air Station
HOC	HUMINT Operations Cell
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence
ISLD	Inter-Service Liaison Department
J2	Senior Joint Intelligence Officer
J2X	J2 HUMINT Operations Section
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDISS	Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System
JOSE	Joint Operations Support Element
JP	Joint Publication
JSOTF	Joint Special Operations Task Force
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTFCICA	Joint Task Force Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority
JTFCICC	Joint Task Force Counterintelligence Coordinating Committee
JTTP	Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
MARFOR	Marine Forces
MASINT	Measurement and Signatures Intelligence
MDCI	Multi-disciplined Counterintelligence
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
N2	Senior Navy Intelligence Officer
NAVFOR	Naval Forces
NCIS	Naval Criminal Investigations Service
NCIS-IAD	Naval Criminal Investigations Service - Intelligence Analysis Division
NSW	New South Wales
OA	Operational Authority

OPSEC	Operational Security
OSE	Operational Support Element
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
PACOM	Pacific Command
RTA	Royal Thai Army
RTAF	Royal Thai Armed Forces
SEAC	South-East Area Command
SECNAV	Secretary of the Navy
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SIO	Senior Intelligence Officer
SIS	Secret Intelligence Service
SOC	Special Operations Command
SOE	Special Operations Executive
SOJ2	Senior Special Operations Intelligence Officer
SOUTHCOM	Southern Command
SWAT	Special Weapons and Tactics
SWPA	South West Pacific Area
TECHINT	Technical Intelligence
TRRIP	Theater Rapid Response Intelligence Package
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
UC	Umbrella Concept
UK	United Kingdom
U.S.	United States of America
USMC	United States Marine Corps

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

As America's Army moves into the 21st century to meet new challenges and changing national security priorities, it must address operational issues across the full spectrum of conflict and adjust supporting doctrine and strategy to compliment the merger of traditional service roles reflecting the US military's joint nature.<sup>1</sup>

General Gordon R. Sullivan, *Military Review*

Since Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada) in 1983, the role of counterintelligence (CI) force protection has steadily increased. The most significant growth in this role has occurred within the last four years as the United States (U.S.) has had to grapple with military operations in the nontraditional environments of Somalia, Rwanda, Cambodia, Haiti, and now Bosnia. Human intelligence (HUMINT), in the form of CI force protection operations, has become so important that it is considered the intelligence discipline of choice by commanders involved in military operations other than war (MOOTW).<sup>2</sup> CI force protection operations are still critical in conventional military operations, but generally they are less important because threats are usually more defined.

In response to this growing demand, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have sought to fuse the disparate service capabilities under the common rubric of Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations (CFSO). With this fusion, however, has come the significant challenge of integrating, synchronizing, and implementing CFSO in diverse operating environments. Current operating environments, especially those associated with MOOTW, are joint, combined, and interagency. Traditional single-

service perspectives on the conduct of operations, including CI/HUMINT force protection operations, suffer from significant shortcomings. Doctrinal gaps, clearly defined operating procedures, and the lack of competently trained personnel combine to make commanders apprehensive about the intelligence community's capability to conduct CFSO in support of their operations. These problems also jeopardize sources and their handlers and could potentially compromise sensitive operations or even discredit the US Government.

This thesis evaluates current joint and service CFSO doctrine and assesses US Pacific Command's (PACOM) progress towards integrating the new joint CI doctrine. This analysis also identifies doctrinal shortfalls, problems unique to Joint and Combined CFSOs, and operational opportunities for the future. Finally, this thesis projects CFSOs' potential for support to future Joint and Combined operations within PACOM. Ultimately, the intent of this thesis is to provide some insight into the complexity of CFSO, outline potential future challenges for CFSO, and provide suggestions for positive change and improvement.

#### Research Questions

##### Primary Research Question

The primary research question this thesis answers is as follows:  
Are USCINCPAC forces currently prepared and capable of conducting Joint Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations in support of theater operations plans?

##### Subordinate Research Questions

In addition to the primary research question this thesis will also answers the following subordinate research questions: (a) If USCINCPAC forces are not capable of conducting Joint CFSO, then why not, and what needs to be done to establish an effective system of seamless support? (b)

Is Joint CFSO a viable operational concept in the Pacific Theater of Operations? (c) What potential is there for CFSO to be conducted in a Combined environment? and (d) What CFSO challenges exists for Joint combat operations?

What is the problem?

Because of a lack of doctrine and training, CFSO is not understood across the force. Until recently, there was no definition for CFSO, few knew what constituted a CFSO operation, and even fewer had the skills or background necessary to run such an operation. The requirement to implement Joint Publication 2-01.2, *Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence Support to Operations*, within Pacific Command (PACOM) brought this lack of understanding to the forefront in 1993.

As with every other Unified Command, PACOM has had to come to grips with the evolving concept of Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations. PACOM, unlike European Command (EUCOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), and most recently Atlantic Command (ACOM), has not had to contend with major ongoing military operations involving significant numbers of U.S. military forces that would have required the operational deployment of CFSO elements. This lack of a major ongoing operation has given PACOM service components time to deliberately assess their capability to conduct CFSO based on current and emerging service and joint CFSO doctrine.

PACOM's internal assessment discovered several significant shortcomings which undermine its ability to conduct CFSO. Foremost among these was the lack of a unified operational approach among the service components and the designated Joint Task Force Headquarters. This was due

in large measure to differences in service doctrine concerning Force Protection Operations, in general, and specifically, the misinterpretation of HUMINT capabilities and limitations.

Why is CFSO important?

Counterintelligence's fundamental capability to provide force protection support has been rediscovered by modern military leaders. In order to adequately support these military leaders, it is imperative that the CI community understand the CFSO mission. It is also imperative that these leaders understand the CFSO mission in order to employ limited CI assets to their greatest advantage.

Analytical Approach

In order to establish a benchmark for comparison, this thesis first defines CFSO and its role in military operations. The study then draws upon historical studies and recent PACOM exercises in which CFSO played a role to assess PACOM's success. To properly assess PACOM's integration efforts the following will be accomplished:

This paper will carefully define CFSO using both the joint doctrine that established the concept of CFSO, and by placing CFSO within the broader context of military operations; i.e., it will outline where CFSO fits as a mission within the grand scheme of all military operations. Finally, this study will define CFSO from the perspective of the Services based on their capabilities and doctrines. To effectively assess CFSO, this thesis will also analyze historical examples for modern day lessons and assess CFSO integration using recent PACOM exercises as examples.

Sources of Information

Primary sources of information for this thesis will be current doctrinal publications, selected PACOM historical materials concerning

operations from World War II, and recent exercise after-action reports. A review of doctrinal literature will be used to define CFSO in this chapter.

#### Anticipated Findings

Anticipated findings as a result of this analysis are: (1) CFSO is not new, but needs to be reinvigorated to support commanders, especially in MOOTW. (2) The current operational doctrine is sound, but CFSO doctrine needs to be further refined, synchronized, integrated, and promulgated. (3) Training overcomes operational confusion. And (4) PACOM has made significant progress in its efforts to integrate CFSO.

#### Limitations

The primary limitation arises from the nature of the topic. CFSO is an evolving doctrinal concept within the joint and service CI communities. As such CFSO concepts and issues surfaced in this work are perpetually changing and evolving. Both the joint and service CI communities are working to achieve total integration of these concepts. Therefore, it is difficult to determine if full integration has been achieved.

#### Delimitations

To avoid the complications associated with preparing a classified thesis, the primary sources of information for this study are unclassified publications and military regulations. Because of the nature of Human Intelligence operations the study will avoid any discussion of CFSO "sources and methods." Therefore, any issue that reveals modus operandi has been intentionally avoided.

#### Defining Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations Joint Doctrine

While many of the concepts and principles associated with CFSO are not new, the term "CFSO" has only recently come into existence and is not

widely understood. Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations are "collection operations conducted by counterintelligence personnel to provide force protection support."<sup>3</sup> Joint Publication 2.01-2 further refines this broad definition by identifying several restrictive criteria which help to delineate CFSO from other traditional HUMINT and CI operations. These criteria include the fact that "CFSOs are only conducted outside the U.S. Territory and use foreign nationals as sources."<sup>4</sup>

CFSOs "are conducted within an assigned area-of-responsibility (AOR) and focus on collecting low-level, perishable information on imminent threats [which] affect[s] the protection of deployed U.S. forces."<sup>5</sup> These operations "respond to local command requirements for force protection and [therefore] do not fall within the purview of Director, Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 5/1."<sup>6</sup> Understanding this focus, scope, and more importantly these limitations is key to understanding this capability.

However, to fully understand what CFSOs are, one must look beyond the operational definition. In addition to new terminology, there exists confusion concerning the role of CFSO in military operations. Moreover, arbitrary boundaries between counterintelligence and HUMINT operations, created in many cases by military doctrine, only exacerbate this confusion. Therefore, to properly define CFSO one must understand the role of CFSO in military operations.

#### CFSO in Military Operations

To discern what constitutes CFSO and where it fits within the grand scheme of military operations is a challenge. Figure 1 graphically represents this complex relationship in its entirety and provides a useful point of reference for the rest of this work. U.S. military operations are conducted across the spectrum of conflict and are categorized as either conventional military operations or military operations other than war

(MOOTW). Within this broad range of conflict many factors influence operations and determine success or failure on the battlefield. However, a key principle shared by both conventional military operations and MOOTW is the need for security to protect forces during conflict.

The principle of security is an essential part of any operation. The overriding goal of all security operations is to enhance the commanders freedom of action by reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise.<sup>7</sup> Because threats tend to be less well defined in most MOOTW environments security may be even more important and complex in MOOTW than in conventional military operations.

Security operations cover a wide spectrum, but "deal principally with force protection against virtually any person, element, or group hostile to our interest. These could include a terrorist, a group opposed to the operation, and even looters after a natural disaster."<sup>8</sup> Consequently, force protection operations are an essential element in establishing security for a commander and are but one of many different types of operations classified as security operations.

Force protection operations are comprised of diverse elements that must combine to create a secure operational environment for the command. Force protection operations seek to "conserve the fighting potential of a force so that commanders can apply it at the decisive time and place."<sup>9</sup> Military Intelligence assets support this effort and provide commanders with significant force protection capabilities.

MI units are capable of exploiting signals, imagery, signatures, counterintelligence, and human intelligence to provide the commander with early warning of enemy intentions, intelligence-preparation-of-the-battlefield, situation development, target development, force projection, and battle damage assessment.<sup>10</sup>

While intelligence support is not the only component, without it, many of the other elements of force protection would be severely hamstrung.

Arguably, intelligence plays a critical, if not the preeminent, role in force protection.

The "Intelligence" Battlefield Operating System (BOS) consists of four functional disciplines and two multidiscipline specialties. The four base disciplines are Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), and Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT). The two multidisciplined specialties are Counterintelligence (CI) and Technical Intelligence (TECINT). While all of the intelligence disciplines and specialties support the commanders force protection efforts, HUMINT, and more specifically CI, has become the discipline of choice. This is because HUMINT is the only discipline that can provide the commander critical insight on the intentions of individuals and organizations that pose a threat to the force.

*Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines Human Resource Intelligence (HUMINT) as, "The intelligence information derived from the intelligence collection discipline that uses human beings as both sources and collectors, and where the human being is the primary collection instrument."<sup>11</sup> While CI is "information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities."<sup>12</sup>

According to Army Field Manual (FM) 34-5, *Human Intelligence and Related Counterintelligence Operations*,

The ultimate mission of Army Human Intelligence operations is to answer or assist in answering the Commander's Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) and Information Requirements (IR).<sup>13</sup>

Whereas,

The Army Counterintelligence mission supports force protection with support to Operational Security (OPSEC), deception, and rear

operations . . . [and] oppose[s] activities of Foreign Intelligence Services (FISs) and security services and . . . contribute[s] to force protection.<sup>14</sup>

Unfortunately, these definitions draw an arbitrary boundary between the intent of HUMINT and CI operations even though similar collection techniques are used in a variety of circumstances. This is particularly true with regard to CFSO. As a result, this arbitrary boundary only contributed to the confusion concerning CFSO until FM 34-5 was published 14 June 1993. The Army defines CFSO as "collection operations utilizing human sources to collect force protection information in support of deployed combat commanders."<sup>15</sup>

The term CFSO was first coined in Joint Publication 2.01-2, *Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence Support to Operations*, published 5 April 1994. This new term was created in an effort to combine the disparate force protection operations of the services under one "Joint" rubric. While the term CFSO may be new, CI forces have been conducting joint force protection and CFSO-type operations since World War II. Chapter 2 covers the historical background in detail.

CFSO is only one of many different types of force protection operations. Because of the inherent risks involved with conducting CFSOs other sources of force protection information are normally exploited first. These sources may also be exploited simultaneously or not at all depending on the nature of the operation. Figure 2 highlights this force protection sources verses risk scale. Note that CFSO is the highest order operation because of the significant risks that can be involved. For example, direct observation of a local clan leader posed much less risk for the CFSO handler than did recruiting someone inside the clan leaders organization.

The key differences between HUMINT operations, CI operations and ultimately CFSO, therefore, lies in the specific restrictions levied on the conduct of CFSO by JP 2-01.2. Consequently, a closer examination of these

restrictions should serve to finely focus an understanding of CFSO by emphasizing what CFSO are not. When authorized, CFSO are conducted only within certain clearly defined operational constraints and limitations.

CFSOs may only be conducted by "qualified personnel" because of training requirements. Only selected personnel may conduct CFSO despite the fact that leaders at every level are charged with the responsibility of protecting their force. This limitation is imposed because of the political sensitivity of these types of operations, the security of the sources themselves and their handlers, and because of the specialized training required to properly conduct these operations.

To ensure some measure of control, each service has a defined application, vetting, training, and accreditation process for its counterintelligence personnel. With the advent of CFSO and the additional skills required to conduct operations, most of the services have also imposed additional screening requirements prior to sending individuals to CFSO training.

The U.S. military is authorized to conduct CFSOs only outside the U.S. Territory. This is a legal restriction imposed as a result of legal interpretations of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1866 and the Church Committee findings of 1972. Under the provisions of Executive Order 12333, 4 December 1981, CI personnel are prohibited from collecting and retaining information on U.S. citizens except for the investigation of espionage. Domestic force protection is therefore excluded. The assumptions have been made that there is no threat in the U.S., and even if there were, that local or federal law enforcement agencies would be capable of providing force protection information to the command.

In U.S. military operations outside U.S. territory CFSO are limited to operations conducted in an assigned area of responsibility (AOR), usually the Joint Task Force's operational area. Because of this

geographical limit of CFSO, CI personnel are precluded from recruiting specific sources to penetrate an area beyond the designated AOR. It does not, however, preclude the receipt of "out of AOP" information from incidental sources. Due to the legal restrictions previously discussed, CFSOs can only use foreign nationals as sources. The traditional limitations that apply to HUMINT and CI operations also apply to CFSO. For example a local village elder, chief, or even a merchant is an acceptable source whereas a member of the Peace Corps working in the same village is not.

In HUMINT operations, collection operations traditionally focus on satisfying operational and national level requirements. Unlike HUMINT, however, CFSO focuses only on collecting low-level, perishable information on imminent threats to the command. This is not to say that information relevant to requirements beyond the command are not reported. It merely means that those requirements are not the focus, objective, or justification for the operation.

One of the best examples of this limitation occurred during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The single largest community of Iraqi nationals in the United States is in Detroit, Michigan. Even though this concentration would have been a lucrative collection area for information, service personnel were not allowed to conduct operations to collect force protection information.

CFSO by design are intended to be a force multiplier for the Joint Force or Service Component Commander. As such they respond to the local command requirements for force protection. This restriction ensures that the deployed commander has what he needs to accomplish the force protection mission. Since CFSO are run to support command requirements, only the command can task CFSO collection assets. This ensures that the command on the ground in the AOR gets what it needs and operational control and focus

is maintained. Doctrine, therefore, precludes national-level tasking of JTF assets.

CFSOs are conducted to protect deployed U.S. forces. When U.S. forces are deployed as part of a multinational force, like in Somalia, U.S. forces will share force protection information with allies and coalition partners. Usually a central clearing house for force protection information is established at the combined force headquarters to facilitate the dissemination of information. While this creates unique security challenges, it also creates unprecedented opportunities as well. By functioning in a combined environment, agents can exploit unique collection capabilities of the intelligence services of our allies and coalition partners.

#### Service Capabilities and Joint Organizations

To fully appreciate the services ability to integrate and conduct CFSO, an understanding of their current structure and capabilities is necessary. Since force protection and CFSO-type operations are not new concepts, one would assume that this mission would reside within the same mission category across the service's CI structure. This, however, is not the case.

Currently, each of the four services has an effective CI doctrine that has evolved to meet individual service needs and requirements. Notwithstanding the individual service approach, CI doctrine is fundamentally the same across all services. Service CI doctrine is broken down into four broad mission areas: investigation, operations, collection, and analysis and production.<sup>16</sup> Inherent in these missions is the capability to conduct force protection which could become the fifth mission area.

Figure 3 highlights that the Marine Corps focuses primarily on the operations mission function, where the force protection mission is located, and that national level CI organizations support primarily through analysis and some strategic collection. It is noteworthy that USMC CI agents are capable of performing any CI mission but by regulation are focused only on operational support. Despite this picture of apparent compatibility, current service CI doctrine is not fully integrated. As a result, seamless force protection support to the joint warfighter is not yet a reality.

With the publication of Joint Publication 2-01.2 in 5 April 1994, the services took the first steps toward integration and synchronization of CI support at the joint level. Since then both the Army and Marine Corps have updated their doctrine to reflect this new effort. The Air Force and the Navy are also aggressively working to absorb these new requirements and incorporate them in their doctrine. These efforts have brought the service CI communities closer together and have resulted in greater integration. However, even with greater integration, the role of CFSO in the CI mission profile is still not clearly defined. The matrix at figure 4 highlights the differences and similarities between the various service CI doctrines.

What this matrix fails to address is the new joint CFSO Doctrine. Since there are no standing joint CI organizations, the new joint CI doctrine capitalizes on the capabilities of the supporting services through command and control (C2) of assigned or attached CI units. This is accomplished through a staff organization called the J2X section and is governed by JP 2-01.2. Figure 5 depicts the JTF HUMINT support structure.

The concept of a J2X section has only been approved and accepted as a doctrinal organization within the last six months by the JCS J2. The J2X is an ad hoc all-source HUMINT section established by the JTF J2 to coordinate all HUMINT operations. Traditional HUMINT operations are

managed by the HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC) while CI operations are coordinated by the Joint Task Force CI Coordinating Authority (JTFCICA).

In most cases, the J2X will be either the HOC chief or the JTFCICA depending on seniority, the operational situation, and the availability of J2 staff. The J2 may, however, appoint a completely different individual to be the J2X depending on the given situation. The JTFCICA coordinates CI efforts through the control and management of operational authority, but does not exercise command and control of component CI assets. This is accomplished through the use of component CI Staff Officers (CISOs).

Each service component and the theater Special Operations Command (SOC) are required to identify a CISO to the JTFCICA on activation of the JTF. These CISOs are usually from the component's intelligence staff, but may come from the senior CI unit's operational staff. Here again the decision rests with the component's Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO). The CISOs form the primary conduit for the transfer of operational data and the reception of coordinated taskings.

Since the JTFCICA has no direct tasking authority over component CI assets, he will normally request components execute specific missions in support of the JTF. If components refuse, the JTFCICA can still formally task through the JTF SIO (J2), but this is not normally necessary. The JTFCICA usually tasks the component commands, through the J2, for personnel to form the JTFCICA watch staff and analysis element.

Once appointed, the JTFCICA becomes the focal point for all CI and CFSO in the JTF AOR. As such the JTFCICA serves four critical functions. The first is the development, staffing, and approval of the JTFs CI umbrella concept. The umbrella concept is critical because it grants Operational Authority (OA) to the JTF commander from national level CI agencies and legally allows JTF CI elements to conduct operations.

The second is to administer the OA for the JTF commander on a case-by-case basis and to provide Intelligence Oversight of ongoing operations. The third is to fuse all CI force protection information from the components and the HOC and to provide the entire JTF timely, accurate, all-source force protection information and warnings. This requirement extends to allies and coalition partners if they are involved or operating with the JTF. This applies even if no force protection information is provided by the allies or coalition partner.

The fourth and final function is the coordination of operations between the CI and HUMINT communities. This operational deconfliction is critical because it prevents duplication of effort, increases operational and source handler security, and ensures adequate target coverage.<sup>17</sup>

Figure 5 graphically illustrates the complexity of these relationships.

#### Conclusion

In conclusion, current CI doctrine and emerging CFSO doctrine are sound and adequately addresses CFSO requirements. If applied correctly, this doctrine should provide significant benefits for the joint commander. From its beginnings in World War II through its evolutionary developments in the jungles of Vietnam to its ultimate use in Haiti and now Bosnia, there has always been force protection doctrine, and it has remained remarkably consistent. The real problems appear to have always been, and will probably continue to be, in the application of CI doctrine and the training of CI agents and the leadership that commands them.




Figure 1. CFSO in context

### *Sources of Force Protection Information*

	High		Low
CFSO (Controlled Sources)		R	
Overt Sources (Contacts/Informants)	I		
Host Nation Liaison	S	K	
Directed Contacts			
Employees			
Voluntary Sources (walk-up/in)			
Interrogation/CI screening			
Casual Contact			
Friendly Force Debriefing			
Observation			

Figure 2. Sources of Force Protection Information

### *Counterintelligence Mission Functions*

Mission	Army	Navy	USAF	USMC	Joint
Investigations	X	X		X	
Operations	X	X	X		X
Collection	X	X	X		
Analysis	X	X	X		X

Figure 3. CI Mission Function by Service

## ***Counterintelligence Functions Matrix***

	Army	Navy	USAF	USMC
Mission Focus	Tactical/Strategic	Strategic/Tactical	Strategic/Tactical	Tactical
C2	G2/J2 to Unit	SECNAV to Region Cmd	AFIG to Region Cmd	G2/J2 to unit
Investigation	Intell only Tech & Conventional	Criminal & Intell Tech & Conventional	Criminal & Intell Tech & Conventional	NA
Operations	Tactical/Strategic (CFSO)	Strategic/Tactical	Strategic/Tactical (CFSO)	Tactical (CFSO)
Collection	Tactical/Strategic	Strategic/Tactical (CFSO)	Strategic/Tactical (CFSO)	Tactical
Analysis	Division/National	NCIS-IAD/Region	AFOSI-IOC/Region	MEF

**Figure 4.** Service CI Doctrine Matrix




Figure 5. The Joint CI/HUMINT/J2X structure

Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>Gordon R. Sullivan, "Future Vision." *Military Review*, (May-June 1995), 4.

<sup>2</sup>LTG Menoher, the DA DCSINT, in a 4 May 1995 Force XXI briefing to students at the US Army Intelligence Center and School, Ft Huachuca, AZ.

<sup>3</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 2-01.2, Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence Support to Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 5 April 1994), IV-5.

<sup>4</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 2-01.2*, IV-5.

<sup>5</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 2-01.2*, IV-5.

<sup>6</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 2-01.2*, IV-5.

<sup>7</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1994), A-2.

<sup>8</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-0*, V-2.

<sup>9</sup>U.S. Army, *Field Manual 100-5, Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 14 June 1993), 2-10.

<sup>10</sup>U.S. Army, *Field Manual 100-5*, 2-24.

<sup>11</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 23 March 1994), 174.

<sup>12</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1-02*, 96.

<sup>13</sup>U.S. Army, *Field Manual 34-5, HUMINT & CI Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 14 June 1993), 1-1.

<sup>14</sup>U.S. Army, *Field Manual 34-5*, 1-1.

<sup>15</sup>U.S. Army, *Field Manual 34-5*, 6-10.

<sup>16</sup>Conclusions based on a review of Secretary of the Navy Instructions S3850.3, *Support to DoD Offensive Counterintelligence Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 24 August 1988), 20-45; Secretary of the Navy Instructions 3850.2b, *Department of the Navy Counterintelligence* (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 24 February 1991), 32-67; Fleet Marine Force Manual 3-25, *Counterintelligence* (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 22 September 1992), 1-85; U.S. Air Force Regulation 23-18, *Air Force Office of Special Investigations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 1 April 1992), 5-76; U.S. Air Force Regulation 31-301, *Air Base Defense* (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 1 November 1994), 22-49; U.S. Army, *Field Manual 34-5, HUMINT & CI Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 14 June 1993), 1-98.

<sup>17</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 2-01.2*, IV-5.

CHAPTER 2  
HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES

Within the context of Human Intelligence, Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations is not a new concept. CFSO is merely a new term to draw individual service CFSO related activities into the area of joint service operations. These activities have been part of U.S. intelligence activities for many years. It has often been said that spying is the second oldest profession. In fact the Bible records in the Old Testament that Joshua secretly sent out two spies from Shittim to reconnoiter the land and Jericho.<sup>1</sup> Approximately two thousand years ago Sun Tzu and his students wrote prolifically on the use of local spies hired from among the people of a locality to provide foreknowledge and information on the conditions of the enemy.<sup>2</sup>

Operations from the South West Pacific Area theater and the South-East Asia Command theater during World War II provide keen insights into historical force protection operations in the pacific and their impact on overall military operations. While material from Vietnam is available, it is still classified and, therefore, beyond the scope of this work. Before any operational assessment of these theaters can be made, however, it is critical to understand the pervasive and highly effective threat from the Japanese that allied counterintelligence agents faced in these prototypical CFSOs. Furthermore, it is essential to examine the doctrine that these agents had to guide their operations.

### The Threat

The chief threat to Allied forces throughout Asia during World War II was the Japanese Military Police, the Kempei-Tai, and their recruited agents. The Kempei-Tai was a general purpose security organization with subordinate functional branches assigned specific missions. The Kempei-Tai handled everything from civil police functions in occupied areas with their Gendarmerie detachments to traditional Counterintelligence functions with their Tiao Ch'a Tui/Tia Ch'a Tuan or "Investigation Corps" units.<sup>3</sup>

Traditional strategic HUMINT operations on the other hand were handled by a separate organization the Tokumu Kikan. However, despite this separation of function the Kempei-Tai still worked closely with these related units providing security and counter-HUMINT support for their operations in the form of source nets. This operational relationship is not unlike current U.S. Army organizational structure for CI and HUMINT.

Kempei-Tai operations were both pervasive and extremely successful throughout Asia and covered a wide operational gamut. Operations included everything from recruiting agents within existing national infrastructures, telegraph and postal offices, to co-opting expatriates and sending them back to their home countries. The Kempei-Tai also aggressively prosecuted high value targets with specially recruited and trained operatives. The airborne insertion of agents behind Allied lines to assassinate American pilots and key leaders, and the smuggling of poisoned liquor for sale to American troops is but two noteworthy examples of these special operations conducted by the Kempei-Tai.<sup>4</sup>

Though not widely known at the time, Kempei-Tai operatives also operated covert radio transmitting stations throughout the region. Many of these stations were near key Allied air bases and were used to direct attacks and to report collected information. These operations were often conducted with the listening and intercept posts of the Musen Joho Tai or

Wireless Intelligence Units in the region. These and other operations were so successful that the Kempei-Tai were often able to provide warnings of impending air raids 24 hours in advance.

The Kempei-Tai was not only a capable collection threat, but also a very credible counterintelligence threat as well. In fact, due to the effectiveness of their counterintelligence efforts, and their ruthlessness during interrogation, many Allied agents died at the hands of the Kempei-Tai.<sup>5</sup> The Kempei-Tai was the entrenched threat that Allied HUMINT and CI operatives faced in accomplishing their mission, but it was not the only challenge.

A secondary, but no less significant, problem was the differing national objectives of each of the nations involved in the war in Asia. Many of the Allied countries had been colonial masters in Asia prior to the war. For the most part their objective was to "liberate" their colonies from the Japanese and reestablish their hegemony. England for example sought to restore its prewar prestige by reestablishing the Empire in Asia. The United States, now a significant power in the Pacific and the world, had other visions of Asia's political, and more importantly economic, future. For the Asian colonies independence and national hegemony after the war was their objective and the price for their support. This strategic political environment was tenuous at times, particularly in the South-East Asia Command theater that was responsible for most of the former European colonies.

This conflict also served to distract planners and often distorted the focus of intelligence operations.

The rivalry that developed between British and American intelligence organizations over Empire questions in Asia between 1942 and 1946 was quintessentially a product of the wartime "special relationship." It was the very high value placed upon this relationship that prompted Churchill and Roosevelt to remain quiet on sensitive Empire questions in Asia, resulting in misunderstandings and suspicions at the diplomatic level, and subsequently creating a demand for intelligence on those subjects

that were not freely articulated.<sup>6</sup>

General MacArthur was able to avoid many of these diplomatic problems in his United States-Allied Forces Far-East (USAFFE) and South West Pacific Area theater. This is largely due to the absence of colonies in his theater and most probably because he forbid the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) from conducting operations in "his" theater.

#### The Doctrine

The intelligence doctrine of 1940, and throughout World War II, was simple and straight forward. These are characteristics that have all but been lost through the years as the intelligence architecture has grown and become intrinsically more complicated. At the beginning of World War II, Army intelligence was still heavily influenced by the experiences of World War I. The Army relied on eight publications covering all aspects of intelligence: *Combat Intelligence*, FM 30-5, to *Military Intelligence and Counter Intelligence*, FM 30-25. The relative simplicity and brevity of these manuals reflect both the scale of the intelligence architecture to be managed and the fact that most military writers were not dedicated intelligence officers.

Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) was a relatively new discipline, Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), though not new, was just beginning to be recognized for its capabilities, and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) including CI, was poorly defined. These facts, coupled with the lack of an experienced professional Intelligence Corps, explain the wide variance in intelligence doctrine during this period.

Combat Intelligence was the focal point of intelligence doctrine. Since most officers were "assigned" to be their unit intelligence officer, manuals like FM 30-5 were required to be procedurally detailed while others, like FM 30-25 were not. Areas like CI were viewed as being in a

supporting role to that of combat intelligence and consequently, could be more general in nature.

The 1940 version of FM 30-5 does not address specific HUMINT collection operations that today would be considered CFSOs, but it does discuss sources and means of collection:

Collecting agencies available to a combat unit vary with its size, facilities, and distance from the front. The battalion is the smallest unit provided with intelligence personnel. It collects its information mainly by means of patrols, observation posts, reports of the front line companies, and the hasty examination of prisoners-of-war, enemy deserters, *inhabitants*, and documents [italics mine].<sup>7</sup>

The value of these general types of HUMINT operations is further elaborated in FM 30-5,

proper examination of prisoners-of-war, enemy deserters, and *inhabitants* furnishes valuable and accurate information concerning the enemy order-of-battle, organization, disposition, plans and preparations, morale, and numerous other subjects. Specially trained interpreters of the intelligence service conduct the examination [italics mine].<sup>8</sup>

While this reference implies the use of interrogators, based on the HUMINT doctrine of the day it also refers to agent handlers. FM 30-5 also guardedly recognized the usefulness of HUMINT operations as a key source of operational and force protection information for combat commanders.

Secret agents sometimes procure accurate information of vital importance in the conduct of operations. However, information from this source will require careful analysis and evaluation to determine its reliability.<sup>9</sup>

This cautionary note was warranted. Because of the nature of HUMINT, most, if not all, agent operations were centrally controlled and directed by the unit G2 at division level or higher. Agents were tasked and launched without the knowledge of all but the G2 in most cases. This lack of operational integration caused both the agent and the information to be justifiable suspect.

To further exacerbate this problem, counterintelligence, and therefore force protection, was relegated to providing information in

support of operational security (OPSEC) functions and censorship. This unsophisticated view of CI capabilities is evident in FM 30-25 which is essentially 31 pages or more of OPSEC and censorship measures and procedures.<sup>1</sup> This restrictive view of may have been the result of expectations that the new Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) would provide detailed doctrinal guidance in their publications. Unfortunately, a review of CIC regulations only served to confirm these mission functions as the primary functions for CI personnel at the onset of World War II. Fortunately, as a result of wartime operations and the expanded role of CI after the war during occupation, these narrow perceptions would radically and irrevocably change. No where was this change more profound than in General Douglas MacArthur's South West Pacific Area theater.

#### South West Pacific Area theater

The USAFFE and South West Pacific Area were both commanded by General Douglas MacArthur and comprised the area identified on the map at figure 1. Throughout the war, CI personnel operated at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels and confronted numerous problems that were significant obstacles to mission accomplishment. The main problem was their own organization.

The CIC was in many ways its own worst enemy for a number of reasons. The immaturity of the organization and where to station limited CIC assets were the two most significant organizational problems that CIC had to overcome. These problems were, of course, exacerbated by the prevailing military perceptions of counterintelligence and initially on what types of intelligence operations they should conduct.

The CIC was a new organization created soon after the onset of World War II and, like all new organizations, was seeking to define its identity, purpose, and structure. In addition, they also had to grapple with how to defeat the Kempei-Tai and learn how to work with theater Allies

during these tumultuous early days. Unfortunately, this problem of organizational immaturity was shared by MacArthur's theater staff. Since the Army had never been this large before few, if any, of MacArthur's staff officers had ever managed or functioned in a Theater Army staff. Consequently, both the CIC and the theater staff were wrestling with organizational issues from the beginning and learning as they went along.

As a result of these problems, CIC was not properly structured or assigned in the Pacific from the outset as the South West Pacific Area G2 history points out.

Throughout the entire war the Counter Intelligence Corps operated under the G-2, USAFFE, rather than G-2, South West Pacific Area. The allocation of counterintelligence activities to an "administrative" (USAFFE) rather than an "operational" command (South West Pacific Area) was inefficient but somewhat explicable by the fact of the continuous geographic separation of USAFFE from South West Pacific Area: this administrative rear echelon remained literally thousands of miles behind forward Headquarters.<sup>11</sup>

Even if CIC agents had been assigned to the appropriate commands, it is doubtful that the USAFFE staff would have allowed them to conduct operations beyond their traditional prewar scope since "the mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps was normal but obviously limited in scope" and "was to assure security of all personnel and materials."<sup>12</sup>

CIC was, for the most part, headquartered in Australia until the invasion of the Philippines. At that point an internal command structure reorganization and a reallocation of detachments within the theater structure caused CIC units to move forward and aggressively support combat operations. Once forward, CIC detachments and their supporting elements worked directly for Division G-2s and even combat commanders on occasion. Despite these problems, the CIC, Divisional CI agents, and even nonprofessional intelligence officers accomplished some significant operational achievements throughout the war and in the South West Pacific Area theater specifically. The following three examples represent the types of force protection operations that were conducted.

### Bataan Operations

Given the grim possibility that U.S. forces in the Philippines would not be able to hold off the Imperial Japanese forces, several HUMINT operations were undertaken by the members of MacArthur's intelligence staff and represent the beginning of U.S. force protection operations in the Pacific. One of the most significant early operations was the recruitment of Philippine nationals in key positions as informants and agents in place. "The Postal Telegraph Service, The Philippines Civil Service, the Postmasters, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, etc., not only had been drawn into an interlocking network, primarily for air-raid warning and spotting, but also represented a collateral framework of information, transmission, rendezvous and intelligence contacts."<sup>13</sup>

Information from these sources was essential, and in many instances the only information available to General MacArthur, as the Philippines and Bataan fell. The best example of this was an agent recruited by Colonel Joe Stevenot, former American manager of the Philippine Telephone Company. Colonel Stevenot maintained contact from Corregidor with his agent who was the chief operator for the main Manila switchboard via a secret phone line for months after the invasion. Contact with this source ceased when Colonel Stevenot concluded that the Kempei-Tai was too close making the operation too risky for this intrepid woman.<sup>14</sup>

Another excellent example was Brigadier General Simeon de Jesus, Philippine Army, and his network of some 60 plus operatives. Most of his agents were either soldiers from defeated Philippine Army units or former Constabulary intelligence officers. Throughout the battle for the Philippines and even after the fall of Corregidor, de Jesus and his agents operated exclusively behind Japanese lines collecting critical information for General MacArthur.<sup>15</sup> Ultimately, Brigadier General de Jesus became the senior leader of the Philippine Resistance.

In addition to Philippine nationals, "many American businessmen, miners and plantation owners were enrolled secretly, with a view to forming a nucleus of information and a potential 'underground,' in case the Japanese were successful in overrunning the Islands."<sup>16</sup> Unfortunately, many of these agents were captured and either imprisoned or executed. Those that were lucky enough to escape into the jungle were instrumental in the formation of the Filipino resistance and the training of their renowned intelligence networks.

Several Nisei, Americans of Japanese ancestry, were also employed. These operatives had been trained by the FBI to discreetly surveil the Japanese population in the Philippines during the prewar months. As part of their cover the FBI set them up in front businesses within the expatriate Japanese community as some of the war's first agents in place. Their cover was so good that the Japanese allowed them to continue to operate after occupation. As a result, these Nisei operatives became great sources of information on Japanese forces and their covert activities in and around Manila. These men continued to render exceptional service throughout the war and as CIC agents after the liberation of the Philippines.

#### Strategic Operations in Australia

Operations within Australia focused primarily on the traditional missions of "investigation of disaffection, sabotage, or espionage; continuous check for deficiencies in the security of all military installations; indoctrination of troops in security matters; and cooperation with other interested agencies in establishing security of captured enemy installations, documents, and material."<sup>17</sup> Most CIC personnel in Australia were relegated to installation security, port and civilian control, routine security checks of cryptographic personnel and soldiers of foreign extraction, and monitored censorship violations.

While these missions were mundane, for the most part they effectively kept the Kempei-Tai collection efforts in Australia at bay. Another, and in the long run possibly the most significant, accomplishment of the CIC in Australia was the establishment of a school of counterintelligence. This school ultimately trained most of the U.S. and all of the Filipino agents that would later defeat Kempei-Tai efforts in both the Philippines and Japan. Some of these new CIC field units were patterned after the Australian Security Detachments and had great success running bilateral operations with the Australians.

Combat Operations in the Philippine Island Campaigns

CIC agents saw their most significant action in the theater once CIC detachments were assigned to support tactical commands during the liberation of the Philippines.

In combat and occupied areas the CIC was responsible for search of enemy headquarters, inspection of public facilities, seizure of telephone exchanges, stoppage of civilian communications except those of an emergency nature, the impounding and delivery to censorship teams of all mail, prevention of looting, checking of security, reporting on rumors and morale, and interrogation of enemy agents and sympathizers in conjunction with ATIS [Nisei] teams.<sup>18</sup>

This nearly overwhelming mission would have been impossible without the massive influx of new CIC agents produced by the CI school in Australia and the support of the tactical command they supported. Once deployed, it became readily apparent to combat commanders that, CIC agents were a combat multiplier that allowed them to focus on controlling combat operations.

CIC Detachments faced nearly insurmountable odds in the execution of their mission because of the vast area to be covered and the extensive networks set up by the Kempei-Tai. Fortunately information on Kempei-Tai sources and collaborators was offered by nearly every local inhabitant. In many circumstances CIC Detachments were overwhelmed with information. As the commander of the 459th CIC Detachment noted in one of his first reports:

As the presence of the Detachment becomes known and contacts are established, the flow of voluntary information to the office is never ending. These informants, after volunteering information, are then permitted to "finger" other civilians as collaborationist or spies. This information is retained . . . and is filed as a pending case for investigation. . . . The amount of information received in the initial phase is so great that it does not permit an immediate decision as to the advisability of an investigation. This system makes accumulation of information of suspects "fingered" by more than one informant possible and serves to build up the basis for investigation and final evaluation.<sup>19</sup>

Using this flood of information CIC agents screened the refugee flow for collaborators, spies, and Japanese soldiers attempting to escape. They also screened all potential government appointees to include local Constabulary and city officials prior to them taking office. Surprisingly, CIC agents were even assigned to protective services duties for key members of the new Philippine government, a mission not traditional associated with CI.

As a result of CIC detachments being assigned to every major combat command, CIC operations in the Pacific reached their zenith during the Philippine campaigns. However, this fact would not be recognized until after the war. In the interim, plans to meet the even greater challenge posed by the invasion, pacification, and occupation of Japan proceeded. This challenge and the evolving nature of the CIC mission was acknowledged in the TOP SECRET Annex 5, "BLACKLIST" OPERATIONS, of U.S. Army Forces, Pacific's' Basic Intelligence Plan that contemplated intelligence measures in Japan prior to and after surrender.

The surrender of Japan or a substantial part thereof will alter the general mission of Counter Intelligence operations. In addition to insuring military security by denying information to the enemy, Counter Intelligence personnel will be confronted with the problem of suppression of organizations, individuals and movements whose existence and continued activities are considered an impediment to the lasting peaceful reconstruction of Japan.<sup>20</sup>

However, this was not the situation in the South-East Asia Command theater.

### The South-East Asia Command theater

The South-East Asia Command theater was commanded by Lord General Mountbatten and comprised the area identified on the map at figure 2. Unlike the South West Pacific Area theater that was relatively well defined concerning unity of effort and chain of command by geography, South-East Asia Command suffered from shifting operational boundaries that reassigned geographic areas to different theaters of command. Thailand and modern day Vietnam are the classic examples of this problem.

These two countries were assigned to General Slim's India-Burma Command at the onset of the war, then to General Stilwell's China-India-Burma Command, then to General Chiang Kai-shek in China, then to General Wedemeyer's China Command, and finally back to General Mountbattens South-East Asia Command. In addition to the problem of who had command responsibility, South-East Asia Command's problems were complicated by France's claim to French Indochina (Vietnam) and a desire to participate in the theater with their European ally--the British. The South-East Asia Command staff also suffered from most of the same organizational problems that MacArthur's South West Pacific Area staff endured.

One significant problem South-East Asia Command faced that South West Pacific Area avoided was the issue of intelligence rivalry. This was due partly because South-East Asia Command had the preponderance of European colonies and because HUMINT operations were focused on collecting strategic diplomatic information. Like the U.S., British forces had no developed HUMINT/CI organization designed to support their tactical forces per say. Unlike the U.S., however, they never developed a formal organization comparable to the CIC. As a result, South-East Asia Command called upon the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and to a lesser degree, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), for the bulk of its HUMINT and CI support. The U.S. counterpart to these organizations was the Office of

Strategic Services (OSS). While American CIC Detachments were in the theater, operations were dominated by the aforementioned organizations.

Within the British structure both SOE and SIS supposedly worked for, and under the direction of, the Foreign Office. In reality, neither really did. SOE-Asia, or Force 136 as it was known in, had its own agenda and SIS, or the Inter-Service Liaison Department (ISLD), was functionally inept. Edmund S. Taylor an OSS staff officer at South-East Asia Command characterized SIS in Asia as "a rather sleepy organization."

By 1944, Force 136 had become the undisputed leader of British sabotage and intelligence operations in the region. SOE was authorized 1250 men and had nearly that number whereas SIS was permitted 175 men but could only muster 86 throughout the entire region.<sup>21</sup> Consequently, further discussions will focus on the operations of the SOE and OSS and their rivalry. While many operations were conducted by the OSS and SOE during the war, those conducted in Thailand and India/Burma by these two organizations exemplify their modus operandi throughout the theater. They also demonstrate the level and intensity of the professional and political rivalry between these organizations.

Early operations in the South-East Asia Command theater of operations focused primarily on India and Burma. Almost from the start there were considerable operational disconnects between the SOE and OSS. These disconnects sprang directly from what is now commonly known as questions of empire. In other words, what exactly were Great Britain's intentions? From the OSS perspective it was to reestablish British hegemony in the region. As General Stilwell's chief political advisor pointed out in a key OSS memorandum "to push Japan out of Burma and Malaya was, at the same time, to assist in the restoration of British colonial rule"<sup>22</sup>

OSS recognized this South-East Asia Command goal for what it was even though the basic question of empire was never answered by Prime Minister Churchill in the political arena. As the OSS saw it,

The re-acquisition and perhaps expansion of the British Empire is an essential undertaking if Britain is to be fully restored to the position of a first class power. Therefore, reconquest of Empire is the paramount task in British eyes. The raising of the Union Jack over Singapore is more important to the British than any victory parade through Tokyo.<sup>23</sup>

While this goal created some consternation with theater OSS operatives it was the ultimate effect that the British objective had on the direction of operations that was the greatest cause for concern.

As a result, OSS was suspicious of every operation that SOE proposed and convinced that there was an ulterior motive behind every operation. Consequently, OSS staved off and delayed combined operations and even ran counter operations to derail British efforts. The best example of this was Joseph McCarthy's, then director of OSS CI operations in India-Burma and South-East Asia Command, use of declared Indian separatists to collect information against the British in India and elsewhere both during and presumably after the war. As a result of these actions and the overall lack of coordination between the secret agencies, by 1942 there had already been several near operational disasters.<sup>24</sup>

SOE, however, was not entirely to blame for this situation. OSS, while required to work with SOE because of the alliance, felt that "a highly visible commitment to anti-imperialism was essential . . . to American credibility in the independent countries of post war Asia."<sup>25</sup> Therefore, OSS operations reflected an American only attitude towards the conduct of operations and in its struggle with SOE. The conflict that arose over OSS Operation Jukebox II and SOE Operation Oatmeal was representative of this rivalry between the organizations.

Both Operation Jukebox II and Operation Oatmeal had the same operational objective, to establish initial contact with Malay guerrillas

fighting the Japanese. OSS proposed their plan first and were initially given operational authority to proceed by South-East Asia Command. SOE, realizing that whichever nation made initial contact would ultimately influence the postwar environment in that country, hastily offered up Operation Oatmeal after the fact. Because SOE succeeded in drawing attention to the issues of Empire at stake to the British dominated South-East Asia Command staff, Jukebox II was canceled at the last minute in favor of Operation Oatmeal. Ultimately, Operation Oatmeal failed when all of the SOE operatives were captured by the Japanese as they landed on the Malaya coast.<sup>26</sup> These circumstances, though sad, only convinced OSS that they were correct about British intentions and their operational focus.

Consequently, OSS set about planning and conducting operations that would simultaneously thwart British intentions while furthering perceived American postwar objectives. Consequently, OSS planners developed operations that would allow Asian nations to discern a clear distinction between the U.S. and Great Britain in the region. OSS wanted to make sure that the mission was accomplished without being aligned with the British in a "whiteocracy" to reimpose western imperialism in Asia.<sup>27</sup> No where was this more evident than in Thailand.

Thailand in many ways became the key operational battleground between OSS and SOE. What was at stake for the US was millions of dollars worth of potential trade and a strategic position in Asia after the war. The British saw an opportunity to restore their prewar prestige and the potential to expand their Empire in postwar Asia. The stakes were high but the prize was worth the risk.

Ultimately, OSS won the battle for Thailand. Here again as in Malaya, initial contact with the Thai resistance forces was the key to long-term success. Additionally, the U.S. State Department was vehement that the first important contact with Thai resistance leaders be American.

OSS did not intend to lose this opportunity to SOE. Consequently, OSS undertook a daring plan to out maneuver both SOE, who were attempting to infiltrate a French operations officer into Thailand at the time, and the South-East Asia Command staff which had sanctioned the SOE operation.

Colonel Heppner, Director of OSS South-East Asia Command, used the absence of General Mountbatten to approach General Stilwell, Deputy South-East Asia Command Commander, with a secret plan to infiltrate two OSS agents into Thailand from China. Stilwell, to his credit, recognized the importance of the mission and supported it despite the high potential for political fall-out once discovered.

As a result the two OSS operatives were smuggled out of the OSS base at Mountbatten's headquarters in Ceylon to an OSS bungalow 150 miles from Calcutta near an American Air Force Bomber field. Stilwell had issued orders to General Stratemeyer . . . to facilitate the mission. After three attempts they were successfully dropped near Bangkok where they established contact with Luang Pradit, the Thai Regent and leader of the Thai Resistance movement.<sup>28</sup>

As a result of this rivalry, CI operations in South-East Asia Command lacked the success of other theaters. The loss of all agents involved in Operation Oatmeal poignantly makes this point. The environment of suspicion that developed as a result of actions taken by each agency to derail the other is most directly to blame for this lack of operational effectiveness. However, there were other factors that contributed to this overall lack of effectiveness and which drove OSS and SOE to operate beyond their authority and scope.<sup>29</sup>

The first factor was the nationalist and communist resistance movements operating in Japanese occupied areas. These groups demanded political assurances regarding their future in return for cooperation and intelligence. Unfortunately this resulted in a sort of bidding war between OSS and SOE over future policy in the region in order to obtain indigenous agents, assistance and influence.

The second factor was access to potential post war leadership. The correct assessment was made by both OSS and SOE that most major resistance leaders would rise to assume key political offices in their countries after the war. This level of access, in many instances, proved too lucrative an opportunity to pass up for agents covertly seeking to further their nation's hegemony in postwar Asia. Too often OSS and SOE agents took the strategic parochial view instead of focusing on tactical operations. This drive for access had a significant impact on operations as I have already pointed out.

The third factor was a function of personnel. At the outset of war in Asia there were very few who knew, much less understood, anything about Asia. In many regards this is still the case today. The overnight creation of the OSS and SOE caused them to recruit the only people with any regional expertise. As fate would have it these were the businessmen, bankers, colonial officers, and traders of the region. Consequently, each had a vested interest in the hegemonic outcome of the war, usually for personal economic reasons. This influenced operational objectives, command and control, and ultimately unity of effort.

The final factor that influenced OSS and SOE operations in South-East Asia Command was the extreme lack of guidance both from the political and senior military staff levels. The inability of the U.S. and Great Britain to resolve the political future of the region contributed significantly to the lack of a consistent and unified operational focus for OSS and SOE. Given these circumstances it is no wonder that an air of suspicion governed combined CI operations in the theater. Secondly, without developing and employing CIC-type units, South-East Asia Command caused strategic HUMINT forces to try to cover the operational spectrum. A task that they were neither prepared for nor accomplished successfully.

### Conclusion

In the final analysis, the theaters that excluded or limited OSS and SOE operations and employed CIC either by themselves or in conjunction with OSS and SOE elements were more successful in their conduct of tactical force protection operations. In testament to the effect CIC had on the outcome of the war General MacArthur's G2 said that "without CIC authorities would have been operating in the dark."<sup>30</sup>

As a result of low-level collection operations run by CIC detachments and their force protection efforts in occupied Asia after the war the concept of CI force protection operations was born. The concept of Tactical Agent Operations (TAO) was now shared between both the HUMINT and CI communities. The focus had been different, but the modus operandi was the same, and remains so till this day.<sup>31</sup> Fortunately, many of the force protection lessons learned during the war in Asia were retained and would again be applied some twenty years later after the French were driven from Indochina.

For the purposes of this study there are other lessons to be learned from these experiences. First and foremost, our history shows that the concept of force protection operations conducted by CI personnel is not a revolutionary new concept, but rather a concept that has not been required since Vietnam. Secondly, indication are that CI agents conducting force protection operations since the beginning of World War II where successful and that doctrine was modified to incorporate successful operational techniques.

Finally, for PACOM planners, and joint operational and intelligence planners everywhere, these experiences speak directly to a number of joint and combined issues. Most significant among these is the need for unity of command within the joint U.S. force and unity of effort between multinational allies and coalition partners. If South-East Asia

Command had observed these basic principles the operational rivalry between OSS and SOE might never have developed.

Such unity at the top enables intelligence support to be centrally planned and decentrally executed by the appropriate agency or unit. Having a national level organization such as OSS attempt to execute support functions across the spectrum of conflict only results in poor performance or failure, and it fails to capitalize on the full capability of the intelligence community. These very lessons have been learned by the services and operational deficiencies have been corrected. With the reintroduction of joint CFSO doctrine the CI community is attempting to solve the problem at the joint level.

The final issue for joint planners is the application of the right force protection capability at the appropriate time and place. To that end this study clearly makes the case for standing, well-organized CI force protection units. More importantly, if these units are to provide the degree and level of support required, they must be well trained, well lead, deployed early, and focused on the commanders force protection requirements.




Figure 6. South West Pacific Area Theater




Figure 7. South-East Asia Command Theater, 1945

Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>Joshua 2:1-4.

<sup>2</sup>Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Thomas Cleary, (Boston: Shambhala Publications, Inc., 1988), 168.

<sup>3</sup>Central Intelligence Group, Military Intelligence Service report to ACofS, G2, War Department General Staff, *Japanese Espionage in South China*, (Washington, DC: GPO, 21 February 1944) 3.

<sup>4</sup>Central Intelligence Group, 6.

<sup>5</sup>General Headquarters, Far-East Command, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, *A Brief History of the G-2 Section, GHQ, South West Pacific Area and Affiliated Units: Introduction to The Intelligence Series*, 8 July 1948, 5.

<sup>6</sup>Richard Aldrich, "Imperial Rivalry: British and American Intelligence in Asia, 1942-46." *Intelligence and National Security* 3, no 1 (January 1988), 43.

<sup>7</sup>U.S Army, Field Manual (FM) 30-5, *Basic Field Manual: Military Intelligence and Combat Intelligence* (Washington, DC: GPO, 17 April 1940), 12-13.

<sup>8</sup>U.S Army, FM 30-5, 13.

<sup>9</sup>U.S Army, FM 30-5, 14.

<sup>10</sup>U.S Army, FM 30-25, *Basic Field Manual: Military Intelligence and Counter Intelligence*, (Washington, DC: GPO, 14 February 1940).

<sup>11</sup>GHQ, Far-East Command, *Introduction to The Intelligence Series*, 77.

<sup>12</sup>GHQ, Far-East Command, *Introduction to The Intelligence Series*, 78.

<sup>13</sup>GHQ, Far-East Command, *Introduction to The Intelligence Series*, 1.

<sup>14</sup>GHQ, Far-East Command, *Introduction to The Intelligence Series*, 1.

<sup>15</sup>GHQ, Far-East Command, *Introduction to The Intelligence Series*, 3.

<sup>16</sup>GHQ, Far-East Command, *Introduction to The Intelligence Series*, 2.

<sup>17</sup>GHQ, Far-East Command, *Introduction to The Intelligence Series*, 78.

<sup>18</sup>GHQ, Far-East Command, *Introduction to The Intelligence Series*, 80.

<sup>18</sup>General Headquarters, Far-East Command, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, *A Brief History of the G-2 Section, GHQ, South West Pacific Area and Affiliated Units: Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA*, Vol VIII, *The Intelligence Series*, 29 July 1948, section IV, 5.

<sup>20</sup>GHQ, Far-East Command, *Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA*, section XXII, 13.

<sup>21</sup>Aldrich, 12.

<sup>22</sup>Aldrich, 8.

<sup>23</sup>Aldrich, 8.

<sup>24</sup>Aldrich, 22.

<sup>25</sup>Aldrich, 8.

<sup>26</sup>Aldrich, 23.

<sup>27</sup>Aldrich, 9.

<sup>28</sup>Aldrich, 26.

<sup>29</sup>These conclusions and the factors were drawn from Aldrich's work, page 9 specifically and the article as a whole in general.

<sup>30</sup>GHQ, Far-East Command, *Introduction to The Intelligence Series*, 119.

<sup>31</sup>U.S Army, Field Manual (FM) 30-17A, *Counter Intelligence*, (Washington, DC: GPO, 20 September 1961), 24-58.

## CHAPTER 3

### EXERCISE CASE STUDIES

Previous chapters have defined CFSO from both the joint and individual service perspective and reviewed from a historical perspective using case studies from the Pacific theater. This chapter reviews PACOMs efforts to implement this new CFSO doctrine. Specifically, the chapter analyzes two joint and combined exercises where CFSO was tested between April 1994 and April 1995. These exercises were Cobra Gold 1994 (CG94) and Vigilant Blade 1995 (VB95). Both of these exercises took place before the new CFSO doctrine set forth in Joint Publication 2-01.2, published 5 April 1994, was even one-year old.

#### Exercise Cobra Gold 94 (May 1994)

##### Exercise Background

Cobra Gold is the single largest joint and combined forces exercise conducted directly by PACOM. It is conducted annually in Thailand with various air, land, and maritime forces of the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF) and either Army or USMC elements as the predominate U.S. force. Exercise focus and objectives are determined by both nations and jointly agreed upon. Because the Royal Thai Army (RTA) comprises the bulk of the RTAF, exercise emphasis is usually on land force operations. The RTA and U.S. forces conduct integrated combined operations from the JTF to the Company level.

### Participants

In 1994 various RTAF units stationed in the maneuver area of central and southeastern Thailand participated in Cobra Gold. In 1993 for Cobra Gold 1994 III MEF from Okinawa, Japan, was designated as the JTF headquarters. In addition to traditional in-theater Army, Navy, and Air Force units, some Continental U.S. (CONUS) Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Air Force airlift assets also participated.

### CFSO Goals and Objectives

Since CFSO doctrine was not available to intelligence planners during the formal exercise planning process, exercise goals, and objectives were limited in scope. Exercise objectives focused primarily on establishing the JTFCICA and defining the requisite command, control, and coordination relationships. Because CFSO employment concepts were not yet widely distributed, each service developed exercise CI objectives based on traditional support arrangements, and not on CFSO evaluation requirements. As a result, service CI forces operated as usual during Cobra Gold 1994. The following exercise objectives were identified by the CINCPAC CISO, as the primary CFSO doctrine evaluation goals and objectives for Cobra Gold 1994: (1) Exercise the JTFCICA designation/CISO appointment process, (2) Establish the JTFCICA staff, (3) Coordinate operations, (4) Disseminate force protection information, (5) Define and assess C2 relationships, and (6) Assess potential for combined operations.<sup>1</sup>

### Analysis

Because of the newness of CFSO, the participants had little or no training in CFSO. Nevertheless, the exercise did accomplish some CFSO-related objectives. Much of the "how-to" of CFSO was developed by the JTFCICA and the component CISOs as situations arose. As a result numerous professional discussions concerning CI operations, what constituted CFSO

and what needed to be done to make it work. These discussions led to many creative ideas, new procedures, and concepts that would later be tested and evaluated. Considering the operational tempo, component planned CI operations were still going on, and the collective confusion associated with the CFSO concept these discussions were both necessary and about all that could be managed. The CG94 participants achieved most of the exercise's objectives.

#### Objective 1

Exercise the JTFCICA designation/CISO appointment process. JP 2-01.2, which was published but not yet available at the time, has a clearly defined process for the designation of the JTFCICA. Once the JTF commander is designated by the CINC he is required to designate a JTFCICA from the forces available to the JTF. This is usually the JTF commanders organic CI Staff Officer, but the JTFCICA may also come from one of the other allocated forces. The JTFCICAs appointment is disseminated to the JTF components via electrical message who, in-turn, are tasked to identify their component CISO back to the JTF.

This process, though relatively simple and straightforward, was extremely difficult for the JTF staff. This difficulty resulted not from an inability to accomplish the task, but rather the lack of knowledge concerning the process. Since JP 2-01.2 was not yet available the designation and appointment process was unknown to the JTF and component staff's. As a result, it took the JTF from January 1994, when it was officially designated, until April to designate the JTFCICA. Consequently, components received notification and tasking in some cases within two weeks of deployment allowing little or no time for planning or integration of new requirements.

Difficulties with the process were experienced by the components as well. The lack of procedural knowledge coupled with the short suspense

caused component CISOs to be appointed late or not at all. However, once all forces were in country and the process was explained, CISOs for each service component and the Combined/Joint Special Operations Task Force (C/JSOTF) were appointed. This problem was resolved with the publication of JP 2-01.2.

#### Objective 2

Establish the JTFCICA staff. Since the JTFCICA was an immature concept, issues concerning organization, missions, functions, and tasks dominated initial efforts. Consensus was reached that the JTFCICA should be comprised of three elements: the JTFCICA himself as the commander's representative, the JTFCICA analysis element consisting of an unidentified number of MDCI analysts, and the JTFCIC Committee or element (JTFCICC) consisting of the JTFCICA and the component CISOs. It was determined that only a minimal JTFCICA staff of three people was required to support the exercise. Three elements combined to formulate the JTFCICA staffing requirements: (a) CI operations did not require 24 hours-a-day monitoring, (b) the available manpower pool was limited, and most importantly, (c) components had not planned for MDCI analytical support from the JTFCICA.

Using the available resources the JTFCICA staff consisted of a USMC major (the JTFCICA), a RTA major, and an AFOSI captain. An NCIS agent and an Army sergeant also worked periodically on the staff during the exercise. The RTA does not, as a matter of policy, have any CI forces. Consequently, there were no RTA CI personnel in the JTFCICA. The AFOSI captain functioned both as staff and as a liaison officer (LNO) for the Combined Air Force Forces (C/AFFOR) CISO who was stationed over 400 miles away in Udorn.

The JTFCICC met at least once every 24 hours to discuss planned and ongoing operations and share force protection information. These meetings also provided a forum for discussions that helped to define

PACOM's approach to CFSO and also afforded CISOs the opportunity to develop procedural concepts for evaluation. Many of the CFSO operational concepts and procedures PACOM uses today originated during these exercise meetings. Unfortunately, not all CISOs were qualified or able to attend these meetings.

Although the C/AFFOR CISO in Udorn was unable to attend JTFCICA meetings, he was ably represented. The Combined Naval Forces (C/NAVFOR) CISO was afloat aboard the USS Blue Ridge and on average made one out of every three meetings. The Combined Army Forces (C/ARFOR) did not have a CI officer to appoint as CISO, so an enlisted CI agent with very little experience was used instead. To make up for this shortfall the C/JSOTF CISO, an Army Major, was asked to assist the ARFOR CISO in the execution of her duties.

#### Objective 3

Coordinate operations. Since CFSO was not planned into the exercise there were very few operations going on that required coordination. The exercised disclosed immediately the need for better interservice and coalition coordination. Different operational concepts as to what and with whom coordination was required became the overriding concern. At first each component wanted to conduct operations "their way" and felt no obligation to coordinate beyond their traditional service channels. In this circumstance modern day operations at the joint and combined level were reflective of experiences encountered by OSS and SOE during World War II in the same country. Unlike World War II, however, once JTFCICC members developed an appreciation for what each component was doing and the JTFCICA established reporting criteria and operational coordination requirements, operations were coordinated routinely. More importantly, coordination procedures were initially established for PACOM CFSOs.

#### Objective 4

Disseminate force protection information. During the exercise the JTFCICA and the CISOs determined that there were two types of force protection information that needed to be disseminated to the force: routine and critical or warning.<sup>2</sup> Additionally, it was agreed that the primary method of for disseminating routine force protection information would be the daily JTFCICC meetings. For disseminating critical force protection information such as a warning of imminent attack a point-to-point call from JTFCICA to component CISO would be used.<sup>3</sup> However, for the JTFCICA to disseminate force protection information there must first be an effective exchange of that information by the components involved. The traditional compartmentation of HUMINT operations and several other factors combined to initially inhibit such an exchange. The following three factors affected the open exchange of information the most during CG94.

A lack of mutual trust amongst components and allies. For the JTFCICA to establish seamless force protection support for the force, all of the parties involved in CFSO operations must trust each other. On the surface this seems simple enough especially considering that the JTFCICC for the exercise was American except for one Thai. Unfortunately, service parochialism, mission uncertainty, and a lack of appreciation for service capabilities combined to create a "wait and see" attitude at first. Unlike OSS and SOE in South-East Asia Command, however, the JTFCICC was ultimately able to overcome this problem with time and as participants became more familiar with each other and the JTFCICA concept. Participation by all members in the procedure development process was instrumental in overcoming these shortfalls. It forced people to work together and enabled them and their service to claim joint ownership of the results.

The second factor that affected the exchange of information was the need for a forum where information could be openly shared and

disseminated. This condition was met with the daily JTFCICC meetings between the JTFCICA and the component CISOs. However, due to the dearth of operations there was little to share or disseminate. Consequently, this time was used to develop the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for the JTFCICA concept.

The final factor that affected the exchange of information was participation in the process by all components. It was the lack of involvement by all participants in SEAC's meetings concerning operational review and approval that caused most of the feelings of distrust that existed between OSS and SOE. Some fifty years later the Cobra Gold JTF was experiencing the same situation with the same problems and the same results. Deployed participants must be present at the daily JTFCICC meetings to exchange and receive information if the meetings are to accomplish their specified tasks. Issues concerning attendance and representation were addressed in objective two. During deployments component representation at the daily JTFCICA meeting is now required by the PACOM intelligence TTP.

#### Objective 5

Define and assess C2 relationships. Remarkably, even with no doctrinal guidance to refer to, participants developed the same basic C2 structure that is in JP 2-01.2. However, without the force of doctrine behind him, the JTFCICA sometimes found his directives being ignored by one or more of the components.

#### Objective 6

Assess potential for combined operations. The challenges of conducting combined CFSO operations at all levels was explored and seriously discussed by the JTFCICA staff. The JTFCICA staff concluded that for exercises, combined operations at all levels was possible, but that in

real world operations combined participation would be limited. This assessment was reached because of operational security reasons and to facilitate the ease of operations. What matters is the information not who or how it was collected.<sup>5</sup>

Consequently, it was determined that in contingencies coalition partners would conduct their own operations, similar to the manner U.S. service components operated, and would have a national CISO that represented them on the JTFCICC. Combined participation in the JTFCICA staff and analysis element was possible and desirable, and that bilateral and multilateral operations would be possible on a case-by-case basis. Ideally, it was hoped that an organization similar to the JTFCICA would be established by the coalition partners to fuse there information prior to start of the daily JTFCICC meeting.<sup>6</sup>

#### Lessons Learned

The following operational lessons were distilled from CFSO experiences during Cobra Gold 94.<sup>6</sup>

1. There must be a defined process for the designation and appointment of the JTFCICA and CISOS. This deficiency was corrected with the publication of JP 2-01.2.
2. JTFCICA/CISO responsibilities must be articulated in doctrine. This deficiency was corrected with the publication of JP 2-01.2.
3. A base organizational structure for the JTFCICA staff and analysis element must be developed (manpower to equipment).
4. The command relationship between the JTFCICA, components and allies needs to be defined. This deficiency was corrected with the publication of JP 2-01.2 excluding the relationship with allies and coalition partners.

5. There must be a daily forum for the exchange of force protection information and all CISOs or their representative must be present.

6. Operational Authority and source administration procedures need to be developed. Issues concerning OA were corrected with the publication of JP 2-01.2, but not matters concerning consolidated JTFCICA source administration.

7. CI/HUMINT operational integration and synchronization within the JTF needs to be evaluated.

8. Report formats and reporting procedures need to be standardized, integrated, and implemented.

9. Communications channels and methods of reporting need to be identified.

10. The force must be trained to one common CFSO standard for execution and administration.

While many of these deficiencies were corrected with the publication of JP 2-01.2 some have been redressed by new service doctrine such as FM 34-5. While this list is not all inclusive, it does represent the range of issues that needed to be answered before efficient CFSOs would be a reality in the Pacific.

As a result of the experiences of CG94 and the receipt of the new JP 2-01.2, plans were set in motion to solve some of the planning, interoperability and procedural issues. These efforts were evaluated in the Fall of 1994 during exercise Tandem Thrust 94 (TT94). After action reports on specific actions from the exercise are still classified. However, overall efforts to integrate and improve CFSO at the JTF and component level were very successful. This only left areas at component and below to be addressed. Exercise Vigilant Blade 1995 (VB95) focused on correcting CFSO shortfalls from JTFCICA to the agent in the field.

Exercise Vigilant Blade 95 (April 1995)

Exercise Background

Exercise Vigilant Blade 1995 (VB) was the first Joint and Combined CFSO exercise ever conducted by the US with another nation. VB95 brought together over 150 CI agents from the U.S., Australia, and Great Britain to train on CFSO in Australia. As a result of CG94 and TT94, it became apparent that CI agents in the Pacific were not prepared to conduct CFSO in either a joint or combined environment at the tactical level. Exercise VB95 was the first step in developing a cost effective solution to overcome these deficiencies.

Because agent training is manpower intensive, most units found it impossible to train their agents on CFSO source handling and administration skills and the new joint doctrine.<sup>7</sup> During this assessment it was discovered that every service and the Royal Australian Army suffered from the same deficiencies.<sup>8</sup> Consequently, a joint and combined training exercise focusing on CFSO skills was determined to be the only way to quickly and cost effectively improve CFSO proficiency across the force.

Participants

CI agents from each of the four U.S. services, the three Royal Australian Armed Forces, and the Royal British Army took part in VB95. Because of the nature of the exercise, VB95 received a great deal of visibility by the respective governments. In addition to participants from CI units, representatives from the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS), Australian Security and Intelligence Organization, and the Australian and British Ministries of Defense.

### CFSO Goals and Objectives

During CG94 significant problems with the entire spectrum of CFSO were identified and broken down into two general areas; organizational/procedural issues at the JTF level, and tactical agent proficiency and source handling skills. TT94 focused on resolving the first set of issues whereas VB95 focused on the second. This emphasis is reflected in the exercise goals and objectives. (1) Train agents in critical CFSO skills, (2) train agents on new CFSO doctrine, (3) exercise and assess joint and combined CI coordination, (4) exercise and assess joint and combined CI interoperability, (5) exercise and assess joint and combined CI communications requirements, (6) exercise and assess the Joint Operational Support Element (JOSE) concept, (7) exercise the Operational Authority (OA) request and approval process, (8) expand the CFSO TTPs, and (9) obtain release authority for JP 2-01.2 doctrine to Australia and UK (without this U.S. Allies would not know how the U.S. forces planned to conduct the exercise and would have ultimately canceled the exercise).<sup>5</sup>

### Analysis

VB95 was an unqualified success based on the after action review and assessment of visiting senior leadership. Despite the initial problems associated with establishing a major exercise between two nations (the UK was an observer), VB95 went off without any major problems. One unique characteristic of VB95 was the flexibility of the basic scenario. As more organizations discovered the exercise, and its aim, desire to participate expanded.

A chief concern early on was how to accommodate new players such as the Special Weapon And Tactics (SWAT) unit from the New South Wales (NSW) Police without loosing sight of the original objective or artificially changing the scenario. Ultimately, since the scenario had been developed in a modular format around a central storyline new

participants could accomplish their divergent training objectives without disrupting the main exercise. In fact, having to coordinate with a whole host of local government and civilian agencies actually added to the realism of the exercise.

#### Objective 1

Train agents in critical CFSO skills. A list of critical agent skills required during the conduct of CFSO was developed by exercise planners and then incorporated into the scenario. A copy of this listing is included at the end of the chapter in annex a. It was also determined that since many of these skills would be new to some, and not routinely practiced by others, some sort of formal introduction or refresher training would be required. As a result the VB95 was divided into a training phase and a Field Training Exercise (FTX) phase.<sup>10</sup>

During the training phase, agents were assigned to true joint and combined CFSO teams. These teams remained constant throughout the exercise to capitalized on peer learning between the members of different services and nations. CFSO teams then underwent an intense series of lessons using the teach-practice-critique method of instruction designed to prepare them for the FTX.

During the FTX phase, CFSO teams were required to plan, conduct, and manage operations. Consequently, they developed an Operational Control Element (OCE), similar to the JTFCICA staff, to provide C2 and analysis support and task-organized field teams to conduct operations. To provide every agent the opportunity to experience operations at both levels teams were rotated mid-way through the exercise. Although the rotation disrupted operations, it allowed for greater agent exposure and the opportunity to develop and evaluate "battle hand-off" procedures.

#### Objective 2

Train agents on new CFSO doctrine. Almost a year after the publication of JP 2-01.2 most U.S. field agents had yet to hear of CFSO.<sup>11</sup> Exercise planners wanted to ensure that every attendee left with a clear doctrinal understanding of CFSO. Consequently, CFSO doctrine was the first block of instruction during the training phase.

The intent was to sufficiently train participants so that they could return to their units and further disseminate the doctrine. In many respects this portion of the exercise was viewed as a "train-the-trainer" effort. An additional benefit of the exercise was that senior leaders obtained CFSO training. Because of the significant high-level interest in the exercise, senior leaders were also exposed to CFSO concepts during their visits to the exercise.

#### Objective 3

Exercise and assess joint and combined CI coordination. Failure to effectively transition CFSO forces in Somalia due to a lack of joint battle hand-off procedures was a significant problem.<sup>12</sup> To preclude such a problem again exercise planners focused on developing clear joint procedures that could be easily understood and implemented by component forces prior to deployment. Another significant internal operational management issue that was resolved was that of source registry in a joint and combined environment. These were just two of the procedures that were developed, assessed, and refined during the exercise. Procedures that worked were captured and have since been incorporated in the PACOM Intelligence TTP.

#### Objective 4

Exercise and assess joint and combined CI interoperability. Interoperability was evaluated from the technical, procedural, and

doctrinal perspectives. Forces deployed on the exercise were estimated to be approximately 75 percent overall interoperable in all three areas. Several areas were significant challenges. Prior planning overcame traditional problems with communications and electrical power conversion, but unique CI issues such as legal authority, different investigative techniques, and the releasability of US doctrine were more difficult. Ultimately, exercise participants overcame all interoperability issues and recognized the advantages and challenges of working as a combined force.

#### Objective 5

Exercise and assess joint and combined CI communications requirements. Because of classification restrictions, U.S. systems such as the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) and the Theater Rapid Response Intelligence Packages (TRRIPs) were not allowed to have connectivity with U.S. HUMINT data bases. This problem was overcome by creating a local synthetic environment to replicate all external national level sources of information. Many of the usual communications problems were solved ahead of time. The U.S. provided all tactical agent communications equipment and the Australians provided all strategic or facilities communications such as phone, fax, and data lines in support of the CFSO mission.

#### Objective 6

Exercise and assess the Joint Operational Support Element (JOSE) concept. The concept was evaluated and found to be sound. Specific modification were made to the concept concerning procedural issues and division of labor. These modifications and procedures were captured and have since been incorporated in the PACOM Intelligence TTP.

#### Objective 7

Exercise the Operational Authority (OA) request and approval process. Since there was no defined structure for a JTFCICA and this was a new concept to the Australians, both sides agreed to establish a C<sup>2</sup> element like a JTFCICA and call it the Operational Support Element (OSE).<sup>13</sup> As part of the exercise, the OSE was required to draft, and staff for approval, an Umbrella Concept (UC) that, when approved, would provide the force with OA. Since the force was operating on Australian soil their UC had to be staffed with the Australian government as well as the U.S. government. Consequently, the legal system of Australia had to be considered and had a significant impact on the manner in which operations were conducted. Unlike in the U.S., Australian CI forces have no legal authority to apprehend, detain, or arrest so this required adjustments in modus operandi for CFSO teams. This was necessary however to insure "legitimacy" for the C/JTF CFSO operations.

#### Objective 8

Expand CFSO TTP. Throughout the exercise tactics, techniques and procedures for conducting CFSO were developed, implemented, and evaluated. Those TTP's with merit were either retained for further evaluation, like lessons from CG94 and TT94 were during VB95, or for incorporation into the PACOM Intelligence TTP.

#### Objective 9

Obtain release authority for JP 2-01.2 doctrine to Australia and UK. Because HUMINT doctrine addresses potential sources of information and methods of collection it traditionally is not available for dissemination even to Allies. Consequently, since CFSO uses some HUMINT collection techniques, JP 2-01.2 was originally published with the No Foreign Dissemination (NOFORN) restriction. For the exercise to be successful this

restriction had to be lifted to allow at least the Australian government access. Given the time available, JP 2-01.2 would not have been releasable so DIA wrote a releasable version of the doctrine as a DIA Publication that was releasable to Australia, Great Britain, and Canada.

#### Lessons Learned

The following operational lessons were drawn from CFSO experiences during Vigilant Blade 1995.<sup>14</sup>

1. A base JTFCICA organization covering everything from manpower to equipment needs to be developed. Such an organization would allow better manpower planning, the ability to rapidly deploy and provide initial CFSO capabilities, and provide an expandable structure responsive to emerging on-the-ground requirements.
2. Command relationships between the JTFCICA and allied CI forces needs to be better defined in doctrine. Procedural guidance on "how to" develop a generic structure that can be modified is required.
3. There must be routine mission briefbacks and operational updates at the CJTF level to provide CISOs or their representative with force protection information for their daily forum.
4. Joint source administration procedures and report formats need to be developed, standardized, and automated. Report formats and reporting procedures remain in service channels. A true joint operating environment requires one standard that integrates service requirements and is implemented across the force.
5. To achieve CI/HUMINT operational integration and synergy within the JTF continued emphasis is required. CI planners need to be involved early in the planning process and CFSO forces need to be deployed as early as possible in the air flow.

6. CI communications and reporting channels need to be identified early on to insure systems interoperability, classification restrictions are met, and data rates are sufficient to support the operation.

7. The force must be trained to one common CFSO standard for execution and administration. One of the services needs to develop a joint CFSO course. As a result of the new doctrine and repeated recommendations such as this the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School developed and now operates a CFSO course available to all services. The Joint Military Intelligence Training Center at the Defense Intelligence Agency also now conducts a Joint CI Staff Officers Course.

8. Access to national level CI data bases is essential to supporting split-based operations.

Here again this list is not all inclusive, but it does represent the wide range of issues that needed to be answered before efficient CFSOs would be a reality in the Pacific.

#### Conclusions

In 1993 PACOM set into motion a deliberate program to assess its ability to conduct CFSO and this program uncovered several shortcomings. To correct these shortcomings exercise goals and objectives to improve CFSO capabilities were identified for CG94 and TT94.

During CG94 the lack of published doctrine and CFSO trained agents mandated that CFSO objectives be limited in scope. Exercise planning had also progressed to such a point that to interject unit level requirements would have been excessively disruptive. Consequently, CG94 served as a test-bed for CFSO development and primarily focused on CINCPAC, JTF, and component staff CFSO objectives. Considering the lack of understanding across the force and within the leadership this proved to be a prudent decision. CG94 also provided the foundation for further concept development and evaluation during subsequent exercises.

As a result of lessons learned during CG94, problems with CFSO were divided into operational issues and training issues. Objectives for TT94 were structured to address operational issues from the top down and provide senior theater leadership with a tangible proof-of-principle. These efforts resulted in many of the procedures required to alert, deploy, and structure CFSO support during a contingency. Despite these efforts, gaps in operations and training still remained. The most important of these was a trained and ready CFSO force.

VB95 was developed to overcome the remaining operational gaps in the CFSO concept. VB95 focused primarily on training the force on CFSO doctrine and critical operational skills. Additional requirements that were unable to be trained or needed refinement from TT94 were also incorporated as exercise objectives. As a result of VB95 the value of a joint and combined exercise dedicated to CFSO training was recognized within PACOM and has become an annual training event for Australia-Britain-Canada-America (ABC) countries.

Through the use of a deliberate assessment process, PACOM compared emerging CFSO doctrine with fielded capabilities to identify doctrinal gaps and operational shortfalls. PACOM then developed an effective program of problem refinement and correction using the exercises addressed above. By the end of this process in June 1995, PACOM was further along in the process of internalizing and implementing CFSO in theater operations than any other Unified Command.<sup>15</sup> Although PACOM did not achieve a total ability to conduct CFSO, it had corrected most of its shortcomings and had identified what was left to be corrected. As a result of the annual Vigilant series of exercises PACOM now has a means by which it can continue to improve CFSO procedures and sustain critical, highly perishable, skills.

Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>J224 pre-exercise planning conference held at USCINCPAC during Feb 1994 between LTC Pierce, J224, FMFPAC-CIHC, AFOSI Region 6 representative, CINCPACFLT-NCIS, and the author as the USARPAC & USSOCOPAC representative.

<sup>2</sup>JTFCICC meeting 7 May 1994, JTF HQ, Chon Buri, Thailand, during exercise CG94.

<sup>3</sup>JTFCICC meeting 8 May 1994, JTF HQ, Chon Buri, Thailand, during exercise CG94.

<sup>4</sup>JTFCICC meeting 18 May 1994, JTF HQ, Chon Buri, Thailand, during exercise CG94.

<sup>5</sup>JTFCICC meeting 18 May 1994, JTF HQ, Chon Buri, Thailand, during exercise CG94.

<sup>6</sup>Cobra Gold After Action Review held by JTFCICA 21 May 1994, JTF HQ, Chon Buri, Thailand, at the conclusion of exercise CG94.

<sup>7</sup>Results of an informal survey conducted by the author of CI units attending the PACOM HUMINT conference Feb 1995.

<sup>8</sup>Major Ashley Black, Commander, Australian Intelligence and Security Section-Sydney, interview by author Mar 1994.

<sup>9</sup>Vigilant Blade 95, Exercise Initial Planning Conference, Sep 1994, Ft. Shafter, Hawaii.

<sup>10</sup>Vigilant Blade 95, Exercise Mid Planning Conference, Jan 1995, HMAS Albatross, Nowra, NSW, Australia.

<sup>11</sup>Results of an informal survey conducted by LTC Pierce, PACOM J224 and author of U.S. CI personnel attending VB95, Apr 1995.

<sup>12</sup>Major Edward Dunlap, Fleet Marine Force Counterintelligence-Human Intelligence Officer, interview by author Mar 1994.

<sup>13</sup>Vigilant Blade 95, Exercise Mid Planning Conference, Jan 1995, HMAS Albatross, Nowra, NSW, Australia.

<sup>14</sup>Vigilant Blade 95, After Action Review held by Exercise Staff, 1 May 1995, EXCON HQ, HMAS Albatross, Nowra, NSW, Australia, at the conclusion of exercise VB95.

<sup>15</sup>Personal assessment based on discussions with senior CI counterparts in other theaters.

## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

Throughout the previous chapters of this thesis some cursory analysis has been provided. However, for a critical assessment a more detailed analysis is required. To accomplish this three key areas must be addressed. They are:

1. The current state of doctrine,
2. What was learned from history, and
3. PACOM's performance to date.

What is the current state of CFSO doctrine? This question encompasses the full spectrum of doctrine: joint, combined, and service. In chapter 1 CFSO was thoroughly defined and put into context using current doctrine. Despite significant efforts by the joint community to doctrinally articulate CFSO, it is still widely misunderstood. This lack of knowledge cuts across the services and affects all levels of command.

Joint CFSO doctrine is like most other joint doctrine, participatory verses directive. This means that instead of directing the services to execute specific tasks, JP 2-01.2 requests service participation in CFSO. This lack of forcefulness has allowed individual services to disregard the portions of doctrine they disagreed with. This inherent shortfall is the result of three factors.

Until General Shalikashvillie became the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all joint doctrine was participatory verses directive in nature. It is therefore only natural that JP 2-01.2 would also be written in this same form. In July of 1994, the Chairman directed that the

doctrinal concept found in the preface of every joint publication be changed from:

This publication is authoritative but not directive. Commanders will exercise judgment in applying the procedures herein to accomplish their mission. This doctrine (or JTTP) should be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.<sup>1</sup>

to read:

The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, commanders will apply this doctrine (JTTP) except when exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise [italics mine].<sup>2</sup>

As a result of this change, recently published joint doctrine has been directive in nature. Consequently, the next iteration of JP 2-01.2 will almost certainly be more directive as well.

Secondly, since each of the services conduct CI force protection operations somewhat differently, JP 2-01.2 was the first attempt to correlate these activities into one category. To obtain consensus among the services and the JCS, concessions were undoubtedly made. However, such consensus building was necessary to start the doctrine fusion process.

Finally, without a universally accepted definition of CFSO very few operational procedures were incorporated in the initial joint doctrine. JP 2-01.2 outlined what "should" be done, but gave no guidance on "how" to do anything except the JTFCICA appointment process. Consequently, JP 2-01.2 was not laden with sufficient information to require much beyond JTFCICA appointment, much less direct actual operations.

The Chairman's new guidance on joint doctrine, an embryonic understanding of CFSO within the services, and emerging CFSO procedures in theater TTPs and new service doctrine will most certainly correct these problems. Consequently, it should be expected that the next version of JP 2-01.2 will be much more directive and incorporate more guidance on operational procedures than the original. JP 2-01.2 is currently being

reviewed and updated and should emerge from the staffing process for field review and comment in the fall of 1996.

As a result of Vigilant Blade 95, most of the doctrine contained in JP 2-01.2 was published in a DIA Publication that was releasable to Australia, Britain, and Canada. Unfortunately, this is where the combined doctrine development process stopped. However, this is not necessarily a fatal blow to the concept of combined CFSO doctrine. Since JP 2-01.2 was flawed because of the aforementioned reasons, so too was the DIA Publication. To preclude inducing any further confusion into an already confused operational environment, the development of additional combined CFSO doctrine needs to wait until U.S. joint CFSO doctrine is solidified.

This is not to say that further combined CFSO experimentation is not warranted. In fact, if anything, greater combined CFSO experimentation is necessary to facilitate the doctrine development process and enable other allied nations to fully develop their concept of CFSO. By deliberately developing combined CFSO concepts and then analyzing them during joint and combined exercises the best tactics, techniques, and procedures can be distilled and then incorporated into new combined CFSO doctrine when written.

Service doctrine for the Army and the Marine Corps has been revised since the release of JP 2-01.2. The Navy and the Air Force are still involved in efforts to determine how best to perform CFSO within their respective services. This process is taking significantly longer for these services because of the unique nature of their operating environments. Both the Navy and the Air Force are expected to incorporate CFSO doctrine into their CI doctrine during their next iteration of doctrinal publications.

One problem for CFSO doctrine in the future will be the real integration of service doctrines with each other and the joint doctrine.

Services are developing service specific procedures that may not be interoperable because joint doctrine is not in place. Establishment of a single source registry for the JTF is but one example of these types of problems.

Services are each developing or modifying component specific source registry systems. No central source registry system has been identified by joint doctrine, but is required nonetheless to prevent multiple service recruitment of a single source. When this deficiency is corrected, service specific systems may be incompatible with each other and the JTFCICA. Ideally, joint doctrine would require an automated central source registry system managed by the JTFCICA that accepts digitized source data from the components and simultaneously provides them access to their source files.

What have we learned from our history? If nothing else, we have learned to keep track of where we have been because it is likely that we will be there again. This sad indictment is a result of the detailed evaluation of both CI operations and doctrine used by CI agents in the Pacific since 1940.

At the onset of World War II, the CI mission was misunderstood and the operational potential unrealized. The demands of combat and the ingenuity of agents on the ground enabled the military to emerge from the war and subsequent occupation with a more mature appreciation of what CI could accomplish, given the chance. This increased understanding of capabilities was reflected in the new CI doctrine produced after the war. The operational techniques and missions conducted by CI agents during World War II clearly laid the foundation for modern day CFSO.

Though not addressed in this study, because of classification, the American experience in Indochina provided significant development opportunities for the field of force protection. The following

unclassified assessments were drawn from a review of period material and bears on this discussion. War in Indochina again called upon the unique capabilities of CI agents to provide force protection support. Despite initial operational difficulties and problematic training and tour rotation issues, CI force protection efforts were extremely successful in the long run. With this success came the recognition that force protection operations had fully matured as a CI mission. Here again, a review of CI doctrine in place at the time highlights the importance of the force protection mission for the CI community at large.

Since 1983 the U.S. has been involved in a significant number of contingency based conflicts and MOOTW. In each of these instances, the threat has been ill-defined and in many cases asymmetrical. This increased level of uncertainty has brought the requirement for increased force protection to the forefront for many commanders. Undeniably, the requirement for force protection support is once again on the rise.

In response to this increased requirement, the services are once again discovering the fundamental capability of CI to provide force protection support. If nothing else, history has shown us that CFSO is nothing new. Therefore, the services are just rediscovering what has twice been lost as a result of the Cold War. However, unlike previous iterations, the current operational environment is more complex and includes newly emerging joint, combined, and interagency dynamics.

Critical force protection skills required on the battlefield have all but vanished; however, sound operational doctrine has not. If we learn nothing else from the history of force protection operations, we should learn to never again let this operational capability slip away once it has been developed. The challenge ahead is to ensure that the force protection lessons learned during World War II and Vietnam are not perpetually relearned in our zeal to redevelop the capability. Today's tenuous and

uncertain global security environment has increased the need for CFSO. However, with this greater emphasis comes the responsibility to deliberately develop the capability in the most cost efficient and timely manner. To do this a review of our history should be the first step. A deliberate and intense study of the World War II PACOM theater and the Vietnam war by operators and doctrine writers has great potential for CFSO doctrine and procedure development.

How has PACOM done so far? In comparison to many other theaters, PACOM has been out front in their efforts to define, synchronize, and incorporate emerging CFSO concepts and doctrine into operations. The PACOM leadership clearly made this integration a priority within the intelligence community. With little or no guidance, PACOM seized the initiative and designed a deliberate assessment program to identify TTP shortfalls concerning CFSO. From this assessment a deliberate training plan was devised using key joint and combined exercises to develop the skills and operational procedures necessary to implement CFSO in the theater. As a result of this effort, doctrinal gaps were identified and theater specific procedures developed to fill the gap. Additional benefits of this process were the education of warfighters on the new capability and the establishment of a long-term training vehicle for perishable agent handling skills.

In the final analysis, PACOM has done remarkably well in their efforts to integrate CFSO. Most impressively though is their perpetual program of improvement that they established to continue the CFSO development process. Using the Vigilant series of exercises PACOM has the capability to continue to develop and hone CFSO source handling skills and refine C2 and operational procedures. Most importantly, PACOM has a vehicle to experiment with emerging joint CFSO doctrine before having to implement it on the battlefield or during a crisis.

### Conclusion

Through the use of a deliberate assessment process, PACOM compared emerging CFSO doctrine with fielded capabilities to identify doctrinal gaps and operational shortfalls. PACOM then developed an effective program of problem refinement and correction using the exercises previously addressed. By the end of this process in June 1995, PACOM was further along in the process of synthesizing and implementing CFSO into theater operations than any other Unified Command. This is not to say that PACOM was 100 percent capable but they had corrected most of their shortcomings and had identified what was left to be corrected. As a result, USCINCPAC forces are currently prepared and capable of conducting Joint Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations in support of theater operations plans. Additionally, with the annual Vigilant series of exercises, PACOM has the means by which to continue the process of improvement.

Joint CFSO is a viable operational concept in the Pacific Theater of Operations. PACOM has proven CFSO to be a solid doctrinal concept through four joint and combined exercise. Current CFSO doctrine also appears to be sound and to adequately address PACOM requirements. However, emerging CFSO doctrine could still benefit from a review of historical CI doctrine.

CFSO first started in World War II and continued through the end of the Vietnam conflict. Throughout this period, force protection doctrine continued to evolve and be refined using successful operational procedures developed by agents in combat. In spite of this evolutionary process, force protection doctrine has remained remarkably consistent throughout the years. Despite this fact, institutional inability to capitalize on this wealth of experience and doctrine has made efforts to quickly regain this capability difficult. The incorporation of these timeless lessons would undoubtedly enhance the next iteration of CFSO doctrine and garner

significant operational benefits for the joint force commander. While gaps in joint doctrine still exist, many should be corrected with the publication of new Air Force and Navy CFSO doctrine and with the next edition of JP 2-01.2.

While the concept of combined CFSO requires serious thought, the potential benefit from such operations far outweigh the investment in time and effort required to make combined CFSO a reality. Because of the sensitivities associated with HUMINT sources and collection methods, true combined CFSO may never be possible. However, this does not preclude national CFSO, bilateral CFSO, or the integration CI assets into a multi-national JTFCICA. Before combined CFSO can become a reality however, issues such as individual service CFSO doctrine, joint CFSO doctrine, and CFSO TTPs must be resolved. OSS and SOE's operational difficulties during World War II clearly demonstrate the potential impact that interagency and Combined dynamics can have on the tactical force protection mission. To preclude these difficulties from happening to modern day JTF commanders and to maximize the employment of limited CI resources this issue of combined CFSO must be resolved.

The individual services and the joint force commander have some significant challenges ahead if they are to realize the full potential of CFSO as a force multiplier. The most notable of these is training. Because CI agents have been focused on security functions since the late 1970s, many have lost their source handling and administration skills. These skills are extremely perishable and difficult to train cost effectively.

Only by introducing source handling skills back into service CI schools and then following that training up with annual certification exercises like VB95 can we hope to reestablish this capability. In addition to agent skills, joint and service leadership must be trained as

well. JFCs and Military Intelligence leaders must be capable of applying current joint and service CFSO doctrine. CFSO capabilities and limitations must be realistically understood so that limited CI resources are properly employed, and their value as a force multiplier realized.

In addition to training there are a host of diverse and complex operational issues that must be resolved. One of the most is a determination as to the role of agencies like OSS and SOE in tactical force protection operations. Additionally, procedural, legal, and technical issues must all be addressed. Common procedures covering everything from source transfers between handlers, services, and agencies to source registry, reporting, and administration must be developed. Legal concerns over the fusion and integration of HUMINT/CFSO operations at JTF must also be answered. Finally, technical requirements such as the need for a tactical HUMINT and CFSO communications capability must be filled.

The perilous security environment of the next few years and the next century combined with uncertainty concerning the nature of future conflicts mandate that efforts to improve force protection capabilities continue. The ultimate test of success however, will be whether future Joint Force Commanders are successful at protecting their forces. If source handlers are well trained, well lead, and deployed early to execute sound CFSO doctrine, future Joint Force Commanders will most certainly be able to claim as General MacArthur's G2 did during World War II, that "without [CI, we] would have been operating in the dark."<sup>3</sup>

Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum to Chief of Staff, US Army and others, MCM-90-94, subject: "Joint Doctrine," 28 July 1994.

<sup>2</sup>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum to Chief of Staff, US Army and others, MCM-90-94, subject: "Joint Doctrine," 28 July 1994.

<sup>3</sup>General Headquarters, Far East Command, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, *A Brief History of the G-2 Section, GHQ, South West Pacific Area and Affiliated Units: Introduction to The Intelligence Series*, 8 July 1948, 119.

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
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
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